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failure of the Wehrmacht to prepare logistics support suited to the resulting
depth of the theater.

campaigns. Although his points are otherwise well made, on this issue he seems
to overreach a bit.

If the book has a fault, it lies in the numerous maps and organizational charts
that accompany the text. Though
House’s prose is clear and straightforward, the maps do not help the layman
really grasp the dynamics of the battles.
Similarly, although House thoughtfully
includes a key to the numerous symbols
that soldiers use to depict units on maps
and tables of organization, he leaves out
a number of the more esoteric ones that
inhabit the book. This is a minor irritant—in general the book is well supported by a glossary of technical terms
and acronyms, liberal annotations, and
an extensive bibliography—but it should
be fixed in the next edition if the book is
to be considered a true introductory text.

In summary, Jonathan House has produced a useful and readable text for anyone who wants a better understanding of
how modern armies fight.

House has a clear thesis that permeates
his analysis: combined-arms structure
(comprising tanks, artillery, infantry, helicopters, engineers, etc.) should be integrated at the lowest practicable level and
balanced to provide the most flexibility
to the commander. (In practice, this
seems to occur only at the division or
sometimes the brigade level.) The commander can then select various types of
units to form combined-arms task forces
that can address the type of operations
planned. House’s discussion of the long
and painful history of armies’ struggles to
achieve this balance and flexibility brings
to mind the equally painful attempts at
jointness among services.
House inevitably addresses the issue of
air support as a piece of the combinedarms puzzle. He analytically describes the
objections airmen have to integrating
airpower into a combined-arms ground
organization, but in his conclusions he
argues against separate, air-only
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McBride, William M. Technological Change and the
United States Navy, 1865–1945. Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000. 352pp. $45

This is not a technological history of the
U.S. Navy per se but rather an exploration of how the dominant culture of the
Navy’s leadership drove specific technological choices in the transition from the
sailing ship of the line to the battleship and then to the aircraft carrier.
McBride’s thesis centers on two points:
that the organization and culture of the
U.S. Navy have traditionally been defined
by its capital ships; and that new technologies challenging the relevance of the
current capital ship are generally resisted
by senior leaders, who seek both to maintain control over change and to inhibit
any developments that suggest a transfer
of power to individuals with the skills,
functions, and organizational relationships of a new “technological paradigm.”
These themes are familiar to those who
follow the academic literature on technology and culture, but McBride is undoubtedly correct in his contention that
there is no widespread understanding of
the specific impact of the dominant service culture on technology selection. A
thorough appreciation of the full range
of forces that drive technological choices
would appear to be particularly
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important in the post–Cold War era, in
which the technological options are so
numerous and specific requirements for
the Navy are so uncertain.
One of McBride’s major goals in this
work is to refute the idea of technological
determinism and demonstrate instead
the importance of culture in technological innovation. He explores in some
depth the intense professional competition between the Navy’s line officers and
engineers during the transition from sail
to steam, and between surface officers
and aviators in the transition from the
battleship to the carrier. He also offers
interesting historical insight into internal
competition for control over the design
details of capital ships during different
eras, with an informative analysis of the
role of naval-industrial relations in the
early debate over the adoption of
turbo-electric drive.
Unfortunately, McBride’s argument
against technological determinism tends
to the opposite extreme, ascribing almost
every technological choice to singleminded efforts by the Navy’s leaders to
maintain the social and cultural status
quo. He characterizes the battleship “paradigm” at the end of the nineteenth century as a “pre-Copernican Ptolemaic
cosmogony,” as if the battleship were not
only the wrong technological choice but
somehow a violation of natural law. He
castigates the U.S. Navy for rejecting a
cruiser-centric commerce-raiding strategy and attributes the choice to blind adherence to the “paramount status” of the
battleship. Yet ultimately McBride does
not refute the case that the transition
from the sailing ship of the line to the
battleship was essentially a deterministic
outcome, nor does he objectively evaluate the failed efforts by others in the
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nineteenth century (most notably the
French) to render the battleship obsolete.
In contrast, McBride largely admits that
the adoption of the aircraft carrier was
more a matter of fortuitous events than
of technological determinism. As he
points out, a narrow difference in timing
in the appearance of radar and the proximity fuse might have doomed the aircraft carrier to irrelevance; it was not
until well into World War II that a carrier could muster sufficient striking
power to hold a combat-ready battleship
at risk. Yet he condemns the Navy’s “battleship thought collective” as early as
World War I for failing to move rapidly
to a sea-based air strike force—including
early adoption of torpedo bombers
(which actually took another twenty-five
years to achieve technological maturity).
There have unquestionably been
Luddites in the Navy’s senior ranks
throughout its history, but there is great
cost and risk in abandoning major military systems that have proven their
worth. McBride is far too prone to condemn the technological caution of past
decision makers, who lacked the benefit
of our hindsight.
It is not clear whom the book was meant
to inform. McBride’s insistence on turgid
academic jargon like “intra-artifact combat” and “obdurate boundary artifact” to
express fairly simple ideas suggests that
he did not intend this work for the reader
inside the military who might actually
make the best use of it. On the other
hand, an academic audience unfamiliar
with naval operations might accept without question McBride’s somewhat preposterous assertions that the “blip
enhance” mode of the ULQ-6 was intended as a suicide device, that an “old
World War II–era destroyer” could sink a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, or that
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the cruise missile has long since replaced
the aircraft as the primary means of
strike from the sea.
This volume does add some historical
substance to the important topic of military innovation, but the prospective
reader should be cautioned that it is neither a well balanced nor a comprehensive
account of the impact of technological
change on the U.S. Navy from the Civil
War through World War II.
JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS
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Key, David M., Jr., Admiral Jerauld Wright: Warrior
among Diplomats. Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower Univ.
Press, 2001. 438pp. $22.95

For more than two-thirds of a century, a
host of diplomats, military officers, and
statesmen have been entertained in their
wardrooms, clubs, and drawing rooms
from London to Manila by Jerry Wright’s
stories and vignettes drawn from his remarkable career. After every session, the
inevitable reaction would be, “Jerry,
you’ve got to write a book.”
Now that book has been written by David M. Key, Jr., a nephew of the admiral.
Key, making good use of his Harvard
A.B. in English, does an excellent job in
letting his uncle and his contemporaries
tell the story, while himself providing the
historical context, one that is unusually
rich in drama and import. Fortunately,
Key had much to draw on, and he has
done a thorough and discriminating job
in his research. Wright wrote copiously—leaving journals, memos, articles,
and letters—all flavored with the special
brand of low-key, wry wit that was characteristic of him. Wright had plenty to
write about. His career was replete with
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one-of-a-kind assignments, from being
in charge of President Calvin Coolidge’s
yacht to commanding a British submarine in World War II (though he was neither British nor a submarine officer).
Born in 1898 into an Army family,
Wright adored his father, and clearly the
feeling was mutual. “Pop” took his son
on hunting and fishing trips around the
world, and the young boy relished the experience. When Wright was only thirteen, then-Major William Wright,
stationed in Luzon as commander of the
Philippine Scouts, took the youngster,
armed with his own shotgun, on a military expedition to Mindanao to suppress
an uprising by the rebellious Moros,
Philippine Muslims. It was an adventure
from America’s brief colonial period,
more Kipling than Hemingway.
In 1914 Wright entered the Naval Academy (at sixteen) because there was no appointment available at West Point. He
graduated in only three years, because of
World War I. He was sent to Europe on
blockade duty, which also provided the
opportunity to visit his father, now Major General Wright, commanding the
89th Infantry Division on the Western
Front. However, the trip became more
than just a visit with “Pop” at his tented
headquarters when Ensign Wright was
caught in a German artillery barrage.
It did not take the young naval officer
long to realize that the U.S. Navy was the
right place for him. He derived personal
as well as professional satisfaction from
his assignment as naval aide to Coolidge
and from his subsequent deployment to
the China Station as executive officer of a
four-pipe destroyer.
Wright remained a bachelor as a junior
officer, but with his special charm and
tall good looks, he was much in demand
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